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Article 5

NOTES ON RECENT CASES
CRIMINAL LAW - Evidence - Dying Declaration.-Defendant was charged and convicted of sodomy. Evidence was
introduced at the trial tending to show intimacy between defendant and several youths; also that defendant had taken one
"P" along on a trip who found he had contracted a loathesome
venereal disease which soon caused his death. Shortly before his
death, "P" told his mother that he had contracted the malady as
a result of defendant's unnatural practices. The mother of "P"
was permitfed, over objection of defendant's counsel, to recite
the declaration made by her son. On appeal the admission of
this testimony was assigned as error as not constituting an exception to the Hearsay Rule. Held, "Dying declarations are
admissible only in cases of homicide, and then only where the
death of declarant is subject of the charge": Clark v. State
(Nebr. 1926) 211 N. W. 16.
The above ruling is supported by the weight of authority.
22 C. J. 258; Greenleaf, "Evidence", 16 ed. sec. 156a; Hughes,
"Evidence" 3 ed p. 64; People v. Stison 140 Mich. 216, 103 N. W.
542, 12 Am. S.R. 397, 6 Ann. Cas 69; and cases there cited.
Dying Declarations are admissible in Evidence as exceptions
to the Hearsay Rule for two reasons: viz; (1) the ,olemnity of
approaching dissolution dispenses with the necessity of an oathit being logical to suppose that a person with the death pallor on
his face and conscious of soon coming face to face with his
Master has no incentive to falsify; (2) the necessity of supplying evidence in this manner because the declarant ofttimes happens to be the only person, other than the accused, who has
knowledge of the material facts. In earlier times dying declarations were admitted in civil as well as criminal cases. "Evidence" 22 C. J. 259, n. 91. Later it was restricted to criminal
cases, and at the beginning of the nineteenth century was limited to cases df homicide. "The language of Serjeant East
seems to have been the unwitting source of the heresy", says
Professor Wigmore, "Evidence" 2 ed. Vol. 3, sec. 1431. The
limitation alluded to by the opinion of Serjeant East was given
wide publicity and credence by Redfield in his edition of Green-
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leaf, became imbedded in American jurisprudence, and remains
to this day the almost universal rule.
The general rule is stoutly criticized by Professor Wigmore,
Evidence 2nd ed. Vol. 3, sec. 1436; by Rose, J., in a dissenting
opinion to the principal case; and by the courts of Kansas where
dying declarations are admissible in civil cases. Thurston v.
Fritz, Kan. 468, 138 Pac. 625, 50 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1167, Ann.
Cas 1915 D 212; Vassar v.Slwift Co., 206 Kas. 836, 189 Pac. 943.
Accord: Latham v. Andrews, 105 S.E. (N. C.) 423, (by statute).
-The rule has been relaxed in some- states to permit the admission of dying declarations in cases of abortion resulting in death.
Montgomery v. State, 80 Ind. 345, 22 C. J. 258. State .v.Dickinson, 41, Wis. 299,308.
The reason such declarations are frowned upon is that the
accused has no opportunity to cross examine the declarant, but
this is equally true in cases of homicide as well as such revolting cases of secret vice as the one under discussion. The
same necessity exists in the latter as does in the former. There
is the same solemnity of impending death supplying the office
of an oath and the same public policy requiring the guilty one
to be punished. It is hard, therefore, to perceive why a distinction has been made, based upon objections as technical they are.
W. L. T.
DIVORCE--By simulated residence in state other than that
of matrimonial domicile-Status of parties cohabiting after removal of impediment to valid marriage. Plaintiff, a married
woman whose matrimonial domicile was in England became engaged to the defendant, a married man whotse matrimonial domicile was in New York. They agreed to go to Colorado and seek
divorces from their mates. Under the law of Colorado no divorce
could be granted unless the petitioners had maintained a bona fide
residence there for one year prior to the institution of divorce
proceedings. However, the plaintiff resided in Colorado only a
month before she commenced her divorce suit. Notice was
given to her husband by publication, he being in England, and
she obtained a decree of absolute divorce. The defendant after
residing the statutory period in Colorado obtained a divorce also.
Shortly thereafter the plaintiff and defendant applied to a justice
of the peace in Missouri and went through the ceremony of mar-
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riage. Later the plaintiff's husband who was still in England
procured a divorce from her in that country. Defendant's wife
also obtained a divorce from him in New York where he made
appearance in the suit. The New York decree prohibited him
from remarrying within a year. About two years later this first
wife of defendant died. It was contended on behalf of defendant, in plaintiff's suit for divorce, that there was no valid divorce
and, therefore, he prayed for annulment. Plaintiff replied that
conceding the Colorado divorces to be invalid, they (plaintiff
and defendant) had cohabited and lived together as husband and
wife after dissolution of plaintiff's first marriage, and after the
death of defendant's wife, and thereby acquired the status of
husband and wife by the common law of New York where they
resided. Held, the divorce decrees in Colorado procured by simulated residence there were invalid and not binding in other
states, hence the subsequent marriage ceremony was of no effect
and a removal of the impediments to a valid marriage did not
create a common law marriage status between them where they
began and continued their relations as husband and wife under
the invalid marriage. Friedenwaldv. Friedenwald, (Ct. App. D.
C. 1926) 16 F. (2nd) 509.
It is well settled that a simulated domicile by one party to a
divorce where the other was served only by publication is not
a basis for a decree which is entitled to full faith and credit under the constitution of the United States. Haddock v. Haddock
201 U. S. 562, 26 Sup. Ct. 525, 50 L. Ed. 867, 5 Ann. Cas. 1
The dissenting opinion of Associate Justice Robb, in the
principal case, upholds the contention of plaintiff that there arose
a common law marriage as a result of their continued cohabitation and conduct after removal of the impediment to a valid
marriage Although there is an irreconcilable conflict of authority on the proposition involved, the weight of authority and reason seems to support the dissent of Justice Robb. Smith v. Reed
145 Ga. 724, 89 S. E. 815, L. R. A. 1917 A. 492; Stuart v. Schoonover (Okl.) 229 Pac. 812; Barker v. Valentine 125 Mich. 336, 84
N. W. 297, 51 L. R. A. 787, 84 Am. St. Rep. 578; Eaton v. Eaton
66 Nebr. 676, 92 N. W. 995, 60 L. R. A. 605, 1 Ann. Cas. 199;
Manning v. Spurck 199 I1l. 447, 65 N. E. 342; White v. White 82
Cal. 427, L. R. A. 799; Blanchard v. Lambert 43 Ia. 228, 22 Am.
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Rep. 245; North v. North 43 Am. Dec. 778. Fenton v. Reed 4
Am. Dec. 244; Teter v. Teter 88 Ind. 494; "Marriage" 38 C. J.
sec. 51, 96; 18 R. C. L. 438. Contra: Collins v. Voorhees (N. J.)
14 L. R. A. 364; Hunt's Appeal 86 Pa. 294; Williams v. Williams
46 Wis. 464, 32 Am. Rep. 722; Reading v:Riegel 113 Pa. 204, 57
Am. Rep. 448; Cram v. Burnham 5 Me. 213, 17Am. Dec. 218.
Some States fairly put the question to the jury to say whether
the continued cohabitation after removal of the impediment to a
valid marriage constitutes a common law marriage. State v.
Worthingham 23 Minn. 528; Northfield v. Plymouth 20 Vt. 582.
JAMES W.

-

COLMAN

PARENT AND CHILD-Right of minor to sue parent for
injuries.-A minor son was injured while riding in his father's
automobile. By his next friend the child brought an action
against the parent to recover for injuries sustained as the result
of alleged negligent operation of the care. Held, the parent not
liable in tort for injuries to minor son. Elias v. Collins, (Mich.
1926.) 211 N. W. 88.
The great weight of authority denies a minor the right to
.sue his parent, or person standing in loco parentis, for personal
injuries-the rule being based on public policy and established
precedent. Matarese v. Matarese (R. I. 1925) 131 Atl. 198, 42
A. L. R. 1360; Mannion v. Manznon (N. J. 1925) 129 Atl. 431;
Smith v. Smith. (Ind. 1924) 142 N. E. 128; Small v. Morrison.
185 N. C. (1923) 577, 118 S. E. 12, 31 A. L. R. 1135; Foley z.
Foley 61 Ill. App. 577; Hewlett v. George 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885,
13 L. R. A. 682; McKelvey v. McKelvey 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S. W.
644, 102 Am. S. R. 787, 64 L. R. A. 991 ; Roller v. Roller 37 Wash.
242, 79 Pac. 788, 107 Am. S. R. 805, 68 L. R. A. 893. It has been
said "At common law it is well established that a minor child
cannot sue a parent for a tort"-Roller v. Roller, supra; but,
the truth of that statement hasbeen strenuously denied. See,
dissenting opinion of Clark, C. J., in Morrison v. Small, supra.
In Treschman v. Treschman, 28 Ind. App. 206, 61 N: E. .961, a
stepmother who had brutally banged the head of her stepdaughter against a brick wall was held to have acted malo animo
and was made to respond in damages for the tort. The court
quoted with appro-ral, Reeve's "Domestic Relations", (4th Am.
Ed. 357) a leading English work, wherein the author declares
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that the child, on principle, may rightfully sue his irrational parent for punishment malo animo. (Smith v. Smith, sukra, a later
Indiana decision is distinguished from the Treschman case.)
Some states have not felt themselves bound to follow the
general rule and have repudiated it in whole or in part. Dix v.
Martin (1913) 171 Mo. App. 266, 157 S. W. 133; Clasen v. Pruhs
69 Nebr. 228, 95 N. W. 640, 5 Ann Cas. 112. Determined attempts have been made in recent years to induce the courts to
allow recovery to a minor child for injuries caused by the parent
but the general rule has been steadily followed. Approximately
one-fourth of all the reported cases involving this principle have
arisen in the last five years-probably due to the fact that automobiles are regarded as dangerots instrumentalities in the hands
of careless parents whose reckless propensities, it is contended,
should be curbed, by an exception to the rule, for the welfare
of their chidlren. Another reason for the prevalence of such
controversies is the supposition entertained by some minds that
the rights of a child should be extended much the same as a
wife's rights have been enlarged under the modern law. But, it
is submitted, if any change is to be wrought it should be done
by the legislature; not by the courts. The courts have gone far
enough in their strained reasoning of late years. It is high time
to rest opinions on a firm foundation, and there is no more substantial ground for adhering to a rule of law than the sound public policy as handed down from generation to generation. The
modern craze for reform has gone far enough.
A father's right of chastisement has always been recognized;
one authority states that a parent owes his child an education;
and chastisement is allowed on the theory that it is a form of education. In ancient days infanticide was tolerated-giving the
parent discretion in the matter of life and death of his child,
SCHOULER, Domestic Relations, (6th ed.) 782; but the progress of
civilization has leveled the rights and duties of a parent down
to a fairly mean recognition of justice to his offspring without
endangering the disciplinary authority of the former. Let the
scepter of parental authority remain in the rightful sovereign of
the household, permit the child to take refuge behind the shield
of crimirial prosecution provided by law, and the welfare of the
family will best be served.
W. L. T.

